Under Australia's current border control policy, 'Operation Sovereign Borders', migrants arriving irregularly by boat are transferred to offshore processing centres in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. On the basis of their poor human rights record, such centres are often criticized with reference to international human rights law. By conceptualizing the Australian-Nauruan arrangement as one of nodal governance, this article examines whether international human rights law constitutes an appropriate instrument to hold the involved actors responsible and accountable. The analysis of jurisdiction and attribution shows that it is difficult to establish responsibility on behalf of one of the involved actors. Yet even if responsibility can be allocated, proper human rights accountability is still impeded given the weak monitoring system and the non-transparent processing facilities. Establishing de jure responsibility in this context is thus extremely difficult, but even if one succeeds, accountability is not sufficiently effectuated de facto. The article concludes by questioning the actual legal value of human rights in nodal settings and by providing recommendations for further (extra-legal) analysis.
INTRODUCTION
International human rights law purports to provide vital guarantees to all individuals within a State's jurisdiction, yet it can only provide effective legal protection when proper accountability mechanism are in place. Academic and activist concerns about the lack of such mechanisms have surfaced in many contexts, amongst others in relation to Australia's practice of establishing and maintaining asylum processing centres in Nauru and Papua New Guinea ('PNG').
1 Indeed, the Australian government is 15 This approach closely connects to the concluding paragraph of Van Berlo, where it is advised that further research is conducted 'looking at the extent to which legal mechanisms are effective in protecting those [detained at the Nauru RPC]': Van Berlo, supra n 2 at 104. Similarly, Andrew & Eden conclude that '[m] ore research is needed into how the practices of state accountability work to highlight and mystify. This will help us see how this process Extraterritorial Asylum (2011) . The idea to process asylum claims externally has recently come to the fore again in the European debate: Liguori, The Extraterritorial Processing of Asylum Claims (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence on Migrants' Rights in the Mediterranean, 2015) , available at: http://www.jmcemigrants.eu/jmce/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/The-Extraterritorial-Processing-of-Asylum-Claims-LIGUORI.pdf [last accessed 23 March 2016] . 29 Flynn, 'There and Back Again: On the Diffusion of Immigration Detention', (2014) Herald, 6 October 2015, available at: www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/antiislam-campaigner-geert-wilders-video-replicatescontroversial-no-way-campaign-20151001-gjzigx.html [last accessed 11 February 2016] . See also Van Berlo, ' Asielzoekers Aan de Grenzen van Europa: Het Plan-Azmani En Het Plan-Samsom Vanuit Australisch Perspectief' (2016) 7(2) Asiel-en Migrantenrecht 77. Of course, in addition to the political applause for the Australian system, a lot of concerns and criticisms regarding offshore processing have also been raised by a variety of stakeholders, including NGOs and monitoring bodies: see, e.g., Bem et al., supra n 1; Narayanasamy et al., supra n 1. 31 Afeef, supra n 3; Argounès, 'Australia: the Temptation of Regional Power ' (2012) 141 Pouvoirs 103; Chambers, supra n 23; Fry, 'Pooled Regional Governance in the Island-Pacific: Lessons from History' in Chand (ed), Pacific Islands Regional Integration and Governance, (2005) 89; Grewcock, supra n 10; Narayanasamy et al., supra n 1. 32 Connell, 'Nauru: The First Failed Pacific State? ' (2006) 95 The Round Table 47 ; McDaniel and Gowdy, Paradise 47 They emphasise that the state's role in governance is still (and should remain) distinctive. 48 If this would not be the case, the location of responsibility for monitoring and regulating the governance network would become troublesome, which in turn is problematic as it would leave vulnerable communities with little protection and the governance field with little direction. 49 Thus, the state's role remains pivotal: its centralized legal order should license the functioning of other autonomous localities (and the rules that they use).
50
Although often presented as an alternative perspective, 51 the concept of anchored pluralism should, however, not be regarded as incompatible with nodal governance. Whilst it fundamentally disagrees with the position of the state as 'just a node', it nevertheless agrees that the number of actors involved -and their interrelationships -have mushroomed in contemporary security governance. The two can thus be united in a conception of nodal governance with direction: although many actors with their own mentalities, technologies, resources and institutional structures are involved in governance, the boundaries within which they are allowed to roam should arguably be set and supervised by the state 42 Ibid. 43 Wood and Shearing, supra n 14. 44 Burris, supra n 39; Shearing and Wood, supra n 14 at 401; Shearing, 'Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge
Private Governments' in Wood and Dupont (eds), Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security, (2006) 11 at 26-8. 45 Guiraudon and Lahav, 'A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate The Case of Migration Control ' (2000) 33 reflects the bewildering nature of the governance arrangements.
(i) The Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection and the Nauruan Government
According to the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection ('DIBP'), the RPC is a central element of the Australian government's effort to protect the border, although it is not run by Australia. 52 This is aptly summarized by Australia's former Minister for Immigration and Border
Protection Scott Morrison during a press conference, where he notes that '[e] verything that is done on Nauru is done under Nauruan law under the auspices of the Nauruan Government and there is a significant amount of support which is provided by the Australian Government to ensure the proper running of those facilities '. 53 This message is regularly repeated by the Australian government.
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As agreed upon via a Memorandum of Understanding ('MoU'), the Government of Nauru formally runs and operates the centres, hosts transferees and provides them with visas, assesses asylum 52 DIBP, 'Regional Processing Centre in Nauru', 9 June 2015, available at: www.border.gov.au/about/newsmedia/speeches-presentations/regional-processing-centre-in-nauru [last accessed 14 December 2015] . 53 DIBP, 'Transcript: Press Conference -Operation Sovereign Borders Update', 1 November 2013, available at:
newsroom.border.gov.au/channels/Operation-Sovereign-Borders/releases/transcript-press-conference-operationsovereign-borders-update-12 [last accessed 9 February 2016] . 54 For example, Minister Morrison likewise states that 'the more [service providers] can just get on with their business of providing care and support in those places, to work with the local host government in terms of processing arrangements which is [sic] run by the local host government, not by a Australia [sic] , that is how we can best assist that process work well': DIBP, 'Transcript: Press Conference -Operation Sovereign Borders Update', 11 October 2013, available at: newsroom.border.gov.au/channels/Operation-SovereignBorders/releases/minister-for-immigration-and-border-protection-australian-federal-police-commissioner-andacting-commander-of-operation-sovereign-borders-joint-agency-task-force-address-press-conference-on-operationsovereign-borders [last accessed 9 February 2016]. claims and arranges resettlement, under Nauruan law, with support from the Australian government. 11 February 2016] . The Nauruan Government appointed three Operational Managers, one for each site of the RPC. Their tasks include ensuring fair and humane treatment of transferees, ensuring that a transferee is protected from inappropriate forms of punishment, and making rules for the security, good order and management of the RPC, as well as for the care and welfare of transferees, providing information about services, food, access to medical care and treatment and 'any other item that the Secretary for Justice thinks ought to be provided to the person because of any special needs that he or she has': DIBP, supra n 55 at 11-12. According to the same source, Operational Managers also ensure that restrictions on the freedom to movement are as limited as possible in light of the security and order of the centre, although this point appears to have become redundant given that -as will be further outlined below -there are no restrictions on freedom of movement any more at the Nauru RPC: Davidson and Hurst, infra n 155. 57 Nauru Government Information Office, 'No Change to RPC Plans', Nauru Bulletin, 26 July 2013, available at: www.naurugov.nr/media/31390/nauru_bulletin_26jul2013__88_.pdf [last accessed 11 February 2016] . 58 DIBP, supra n 52; DIBP, supra n 55. 59 DIBP, supra n 55 at 12. 60 Ibid. 61 Moss, supra n 55 at 21. 62 Ibid. communications forum between the Nauruan and Australian Governments to discuss the potential effects of refugee settlement on the local Nauruan community.
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It should be noted, however, that in particular the Australian discourse on the RPCs is at best confusing, at worst somewhat schizophrenic. The Australian Government has sometimes acknowledged its responsibility for the RPCs whilst it at other times has argued that they are matters of Nauru. 64 In essence, the picture painted by the Australian Government is one in which Nauru has the ultimate authority but Australia has a de facto large influence and a significant discretionary decision making space.
65
(ii) The service providers discuss issues of care and well-being with the Nauruan Operational Managers in a number of 'stakeholder forums', which is supported by the DIBP. 79 They also discuss with both the Nauruan Government and the DIBP how to strengthen the personal safety and privacy of transferees. September. 88 DIBP, supra n 55 at 26. 89 Narayanasamy et al., supra n 1 at 22; Welch, supra n 1; Van Berlo, supra n 25. subcontractors are also engaged. This constitutes however no major obstacle for purposes of the present article's argument. In fact, the fluctuating and obfuscated practice of subcontracting relates closely to the nodal governance model as it stresses the hybrid nature of governance and the limited relevance of isolating individual actors from the governance network for analytical purposes. The Nauru Police Force has to undertake community policing patrols to the RPC. 98 In addition, the Nauru Police Force has two officers permanently deployed at the RPC to cooperate with service providers for investigation purposes. 99 The Australian Federal Police advices the Nauru Police Force on the coordination of policing at the RPC and on investigation training.
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The DIBP cooperates with the Nauru Police Force, as well as with the Nauruan Operational Managers and the service delivery staff to handle incidents in the RPC. 101 To this end, incident management arrangements and management protocols exist, and the DIBP has 90 Moss, supra n 55 at 21-22. 91 DIBP, supra n 52; DIBP; supra n 55. 92 107 Ibid. The DIBP maintains that 'the Department will work with service providers to review processes to ensure that allegations that are not formally reported are recorded and tracked in a similar manner. This will ensure a comprehensive understanding of issues and enable follow up action to be transparently monitored': ibid, at 9. 108 Ibid, at 14 and 55. 109 Ibid, at 26. 110 Ibid, at 40.
*Figure 1: Governance in the Nauru RPC
As the complexity of Figure 1 depicts, the Australian-Nauruan arrangements can thus be regarded as combining nodal governance and anchored pluralism -at least to a certain degree. Through the networked interaction between a variety of cooperating, contesting and conflicting actors, governance and power materialize. At the same time, the Nauruan and Australian governments have implemented a number of anchoring points including contractual stipulations, formal and informal communications, incident management arrangements and management protocols, daily and weekly meetings, minimum standards for service providers, codes of conduct, joint committees and working groups. Through these anchoring mechanisms, they curtail -at least on paper -'the unfettered "invisible hand" of capitalist economies'.
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111 Boutellier and van Steden, supra n 47 at 468.
HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE NAURU REGIONAL PROCESSING CENTRE
A nodal set-up is not per definition problematic under international law: there are no international legal norms directly prescribing, endorsing, or prohibiting the trend towards nodal governance of State services, tasks and functions. 112 Nevertheless, nodal governance in the immigration realm seems to raise a plurality of legal accountability questions which are only addressed since 'relatively recently'.
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Effective legal human rights protection depends on both responsibility and accountability. They are key concepts of a democratic and legitimate government: without them, democracy remains a 'paper procedure'. 114 Both are connected through a two-step process: first, an actor can be responsible for certain legal obligations, which can be identified and delineated by looking at the relevant legal instrument, whilst second, the actor can be held accountable for the way in which it exercises its responsibilities. Such accountability exists of both 'answerability' and 'enforcement'. 115 There thus needs to be 'a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences'.
116

A. Responsibility
Three types of actors are involved in the RPC: territorial (Nauruan) state actors, extraterritorial (Australian) state actors and private actors. For international human rights responsibility to be triggered, an alleged abuse must be a breach of one of these actors' international obligations (for which the notion of jurisdiction provides guidance) and must be attributable to that actor. 117 Both will be assessed below for each of the three types of actors involved. by a foreign power and Nauru exercises a certain degree of sovereign control over the asylum seekers processed in the RPC. As such, Nauru is bound to respect, protect and fulfil its human rights obligations and is responsible for potential human rights violations that it commits in the RPC as part of its territory.
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Jurisdiction of Australia
Assessing whether Australia has human rights obligations in the Nauru RPC likewise requires an evaluation of its jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction, however, appears more problematic as human rights obligations beyond the territory of a State were for a long time regarded as 'non-existent or minimalistic at best'. 126 As Gammeltoft-Hansen points out, a clash may be observed in this respect between the sollen and the sein of human rights law: whilst the idea of universality and inalienable protection is inherent to international human rights norms, they are simultaneously put forward as positive law in the form of international covenants and treaties based on the primacy of territorial jurisdiction. 127 Amongst others, this discrepancy has caused the territorial paradigm to be increasingly questioned, in particular because
States nowadays have the ability to impact upon human rights far beyond their own borders.
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In recent case law and scholarship, the notion of 'extraterritorial jurisdiction' has gained importance. It entails that a state also carries responsibility for human rights obligations beyond its sovereign territory. Treaty monitoring bodies indeed increasingly clarify that a State's jurisdiction under international human rights law can and does extend beyond its sovereign borders. 129 Whilst for some such jurisdiction remains the exception to the norm, 130 others have argued that it is more than exceptional.
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In examining this topic, one cannot ignore the gist of the ECtHR's case law as it is arguably the strongest human rights protection mechanism at the international level and has had a significant influence on the conceptualisation of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 132 The ECtHR has primarily 125 Taylor, supra n 5 at 15-16. 126 Vandenhole and Van Genugten, supra n 120 at 1. 127 Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra n 28; see also Milanovic, supra n 117. 128 Vandenhole and Van Genugten, supra n 120 at 1; Vandenhole and Gibney, supra n 122 at 1-2. 129 Coomans and Kamminga, supra n 121; Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra n 28; Den Heijer, supra n 28; Mantouvalou, replaced, the governance nature of the RPC as well as the levels of actual control of the various actors are constantly changing. For example, Nauru introduced Operational Managers in the RPC in 2014, 156 which -at least in theory -provides the Nauruan Government with better technologies to influence the governance field and with a larger extent of control. Another example is the fluctuating involvement of private actors, which at some stages have a significant influence and at other stages a more modest one.
Transfield/Broadspectrum, for example, has gained in control and importance over the past years as it is gradually given more responsibility for providing a host of services. 157 Whilst the effective control requirement necessitates a factual assessment, the facts and power relations thus continuously change, thereby influencing the level of control of the various actors involved in unpredictable and often indiscernible ways. Control rests primarily with the network, not so much with a single actor -at least not all the time. Determining that an actor has effective control today does, therefore, not mean that it has such effective control tomorrow: in the face of a concrete alleged human rights abuse, this question needs to be constantly re-assessed on the basis of the evolving circumstances and the ever-changing power structure of the nodal network. Den Heijer aptly summarizes that the multitude of actors involved in the Nauru RPC, as well as the complex legal arrangements, make it difficult to give a final answer: whether the sovereignty threshold is met depends on the specific complaint and the particular involvement of the various actors. 158 At the same time, the governance arrangements and the Nauru RPC are neither very transparent nor accessible as will be further outlined below. This hampers the factual assessment of effective control that is needed to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction in the face of a concrete allegation of a human rights abuse.
A potential way to get around these problems is to look at case law on extradition, where various monitoring bodies including the HRC and the ECtHR have noted that a State may be in violation of its obligations if it extradites an individual to a State where his or her rights are likely to be violated.
159
Nevertheless, these cases concerned scenarios in which the person to be extradited faced a real risk of being tortured or being inhumanely or degradingly treated, which are rather clear potential future violations of human rights. In the present case, this is different: given the lack of transparency and the fact that Australia has sought assurances and monitors the facilities, it is hardly possible to establish a priori whether and to what extent a transferred migrant will face a violation of his or her rights at the Nauru RPC. This is particularly the case now that the RPC has been transformed into an open-centre arrangement, thereby ending the practice of indiscriminate and indefinite mandatory detention which before its abolition could arguably be construed as a foreseeable violation of the human right to liberty and the prohibition of arbitrary detention. Whilst there may be some indications that the RPC's 156 DIBP, supra n 55 at 11; Nauru Government Information Office, supra n 56. 157 conditions are not optimal, under the open-centre arrangements it is hence not clear that a violation of for example the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment will occur and is foreseeable, which depends on a factual assessment and the level and credibility of assurances attained.
Australia argues that the implemented monitoring mechanisms prevent such violations, and given that first-hand and real-time information on the present human rights situation in the Nauru RPC remains incidental and scarce, it is difficult to reject such a proposition in the context of potential future violations. It would consequently be too easy to reject Australia's assurances right away, yet at the same time it is too difficult to irrefutably prove them wrong.
The private actors
In the Westphalian system, international human rights law was particularly created and modelled to circumscribe the extent and use of public power by sovereign States. 160 Only States can thus be the respondent to complaints under human rights treaties that provide for a complaint mechanism. 161 Trends of nodal governance challenge this traditional view because non-State actors increasingly engage as governance actors in human rights-related conduct. 162 Multinational corporations involved in such arrangements often have a far larger economic power than some sovereign States (including Nauru)
which seems an appropriate reason to impose human rights duties on corporations. 163 The option of extending human rights duties horizontally to private actors is for some consequently a promising strategy, 164 yet such developments have not changed the state-centric approach from being the dominant foundation of positive international human rights law. 165 To some extent, norms are developed by international and regional organisations, the corporate world itself and civil society in order to enhance Yugoslavia maintained that in relation to acts of (non-militarily organized) private actors, the instructions need to be issued with regard to each particular alleged violation of human rights. 203 Yet this is not the case in the Nauru RPC, where there is no conclusive evidence that the Australian or Nauruan Government issued instructions to private contractors that entail specific abuses of human rights. To the contrary, the Australian Government contractually requires service providers to comply with human rights norms. 204 It is thus problematic to maintain that alleged human rights abuses of private actors can be attributed to Australia or Nauru on the basis of lawful instructions or generic service contracts.
Joint responsibility of states
Conduct constituting an alleged human rights abuse can also be attributed to multiple States at the same time (Article 47 Draft Articles). This can happen in three situations: (a) when a number of States have acted independently in relation to the same abuse and their actions can be attributed to them via the above outlined attribution rules, (b) when a State takes part in the abuses of another State ('derived responsibility') and (c) when multiple states genuinely act in concert and this joint act engages the responsibility of each of these States.
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The former encounters the same attribution problems as outlined above. In relation to the latter, holding States involved in 'the joint management of facilities for external processing of migrants' responsible for joint conduct or conduct of a joint organ does not appear problematic: it is confirmed by the ILC and remains rather uncontested. 206 What is problematic, however, is determining when acts and organs must be considered as 'joint': the logic of international State responsibility may imply that conduct and organs are only 'joint' 'when the activity complained of was carried out in accordance with the instructions of all states involved and that all responsible states had it in their power to prevent the alleged misconduct '. 207 It is very questionable whether this is the case in the Nauru RPC: with a myriad of actors cooperating, contesting and conflicting, it is difficult to discern what the involvement of the Australian and Nauruan authorities is in relation to specific conduct. Are acts of the deployed DIBP staff 'joint' acts? Are those of the Operational Managers? Or those of the private contractors? As nodal governance theory informs us, all these actors pursue different goals, with different mentalities, resources, technologies and institutional structures. In doing so, human rights may be abused-yet the plethora of interaction going on in the governance network makes it difficult, if not impossible, to observe whether the Australian and/or Nauruan State either instructed the specific rights-abusing behaviour or had the power to prevent it, and whether they did so individually, jointly or otherwise. 205 See also Den Heijer, supra n 28 at 95. 206 Ibid, at 96. 207 Ibid, at 98. In relation to the concept of derived responsibility, it is stipulated in Chapter IV of the Draft Articles that a State involved in the wrongful acts or omissions of another State can be held responsible separately on account of its involvement. This differs from attribution of conduct to the State in that derived responsibility applies in exceptional situations where the State's international responsibility is dependent upon, and derives from, another state's conduct. In these instances, the State itself did not carry out a human rights abuse but was involved in the human rights abuse of another State. This includes situations (i) when a State assists another State in the commission of a human rights abuse (Article 16 Draft Articles), (ii) when a State controls and directs another State in committing a human rights abuse (Article 17 Draft Articles) and (iii) when a State exercises coercion vis-à-vis another State to commit a human rights abuse (Article 18 Draft Articles).
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Option (i) is particularly interesting in the domain of migration control, as migration-receiving States (such as Australia) often provide all kinds of assistance to origin, transit or processing countries (such as Nauru).
209 However, there is no academic consensus and little jurisprudence on derived responsibility on the basis of aid and assistance. Its customary law status is therefore disputed. 210 In addition, a problematic aspect of derived responsibility on the basis of aid and/or assistance is that it requires the assistance-providing State to provide such assistance 'with knowledge of the circumstances of the international wrongful act', which has been interpreted by the ILC as not only containing a requirement of knowledge, but also one of intent. Thus, the aid and assistance must be provided with the goal of enabling the commission of an international wrongful act.
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In the present case, it will again depend on the concrete circumstances whether or not Australia and/or Nauru can be held responsible on the basis of derived responsibility. It requires, on the one hand, the attribution of human rights violating conduct to either Australia or Nauru and, on the other hand, proof that the other State provided assistance in the commission of that particular conduct with both knowledge and intent. On first sight, it thus provides a workable solution for nodal settings: not one, but multiple States can be held accountable for human rights violating conduct, even if not all of these States carried out the conduct themselves or had the power to instruct or prevent it. On second thought, however, nodal governance difficulties persist: derived responsibility requires that the violating conduct can be attributed to at least one State, after which other States can also be implicated for their assistance.
Even when it is clear that abuses result from particular conduct of one of the private contractors -which in practice provide the services with the largest potential of abusing rights -212 the subsequent attribution 208 See also ibid, at 101. 209 Ibid, at 101. 210 Ibid, at 102-103. 211 Ibid, at 105. 212 Providing security services, Wilson Security is for example often alleged to infringe upon human rights entitlements by arbitrary detention, insufficient detention conditions, abuse, (sexual) violence, insufficient protection of the special circumstances and needs of groups of asylum seekers, and discrimination: see for example Doherty and Davidson, 'Wilson Security Guards Handcuffed Asylum Seeker Boy on Nauru as a 'Joke'', Guardian, 28 August 2015, available at: www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/aug/28/wilson-security-guardshandcuffed-asylum-seeker-boy-on-nauru-as-a-joke [last accessed 9 February 2016]; McKenzie-Murray, 'Nauru of that conduct to a State remains difficult for the reasons set out above, continuing to obstruct effective attribution also in the case of derived responsibility. In addition, establishing intent on behalf of the aiding State to facilitate the occurrence of human rights abuses remains difficult in practice.
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Positive obligations
The concept of positive obligations has slowly but progressively been introduced in international human rights law, largely through decisions of international courts. 214 It entails that national authorities have to adopt reasonable and suitable measures to safeguard human rights, either of a judicial nature (such as the provision of sanctions for individuals infringing a right) or of a practical nature (such as the provision of measures to protect an individual within its jurisdiction from the potentially harmful activities of other actors). 215 Positive obligations of the state comprise both substantive obligations, requiring that basic measures are taken to ensure the full enjoyment of rights, and procedural obligations, requiring the provision of proper remedies in cases of rights abuses.
216
Whilst not constituting a rule of attribution, positive obligations provide an alternative way of establishing State responsibility for human rights abuses. Even when particular conduct cannot be attributed to the State, the State can still have acted in breach of its own positive obligation under international human rights law. This includes the responsibility to protect individuals from a horizontal human rights violation -that is, an abuse of human rights by for example one of the private contractors.
As states are 'neither omniscient nor omnipotent', positive obligations are however not absolute but require a State to exercise due diligence by adopting the required measures reasonably within their power to achieve the protection of individuals. 217 This closely aligns to the anchored pluralism concept: the State should provide 'anchoring points' in the nodal field and actively monitor the behaviour of the various parties involved.
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In case of an alleged human rights abuse, it should thus first be established that Nauru and/or Australia has jurisdiction (which, as outlined above, is presumed to exist for Nauru but is more uncertain and requires a factual assessment in relation to Australia which is difficult to perform). Second, it must be proven that Nauru and/or Australia did not adopt the required measures reasonably within their power (a) to prevent the abuse from occurring or (b) to provide procedural redress. DIBP and all international partners in the South Pacific, including Nauru. 220 In case of a human rights abuse, these mechanisms need to be evaluated to assess whether they satisfied the positive obligation of Nauru and/or Australia to exercise the required level of due diligence.
In relation to (b), whether sufficient redress is provided likewise depends on the specific rights violation and the procedural mechanisms made available by the involved States. In some cases, the violation will constitute a criminal offence after which police investigations and potentially criminal prosecutions will be commenced. In other cases, investigations by for example the service provider or the DIBP may be sufficient to provide proper redress. Still in other cases, grave violations may necessitate the existence of an impartial judicial or non-judicial complaint mechanism which can easily be accessed by potential victims. Under some circumstances, the absence of adequate redress mechanisms thus could be an avenue to hold Nauru and/or Australia responsible.
The obligation to provide sufficient procedural redress is, however, somewhat paradoxical. States violate their positive obligations if they do not provide sufficient procedural redress -including access to justice -to a victim of a human rights abuse, yet if no access to justice is provided and no procedural redress mechanisms are in place, it is difficult or even impossible for victims to have such positive obligations enforced. Put simply, without a remedy being available, the violation of a right to a remedy is difficult to enforce in practice. Here, there is thus an inherent tension between de jure responsibility and de facto enforceability -which brings us to the second step of proper legal human rights protection: that of accountability.
219 See for example Moss, supra n 55. 220 DIBP, supra n 52; DIBP, supra n 55.
B. Accountability
In light of the foregoing, it is extremely difficult to definitely establish and delineate de jure human rights responsibilities in the Australian-Nauruan offshore RPC arrangements. International human rights law is only triggered when abuses happen within the jurisdiction of a State and can be attributed to that
State, yet the nodal set-up of the processing arrangements, including the developments of offshoring and privatisation, increasingly challenges the accuracy and effectiveness of these fundamental prerequisites.
Demarcating legal international human rights responsibilities in these situations indeed becomes increasingly difficult because the factual arrangements and power structures constantly change in an ever-reconfiguring nodal field, distancing the State from abuses through the involvement of additional public and private actors. The on-going trend towards nodal governance consequently provides States with opportunities to explore the legal margins of human rights law and manoeuvre themselves outside of its reach, both in relation to negative and positive obligations.
In concrete cases, establishing human rights responsibility could however still be possible.
Indeed, some cases entail clear-cut breaches of human rights that fall within the jurisdiction of, and are attributable to, Australia and/or Nauru -one could, for example, think about potential misconduct by the Australian Federal Police or the Nauruan Police Force resulting in a human rights abuse. In such cases,
human rights law appears to provide a spark of optimism in relation to a victim's protection -yet such optimism fades when considering the level of accountability on which de jure responsibilities ought to be transformed into de facto safeguards. Illustrated by two examples, this section argues that the setting in which the RPC is situated, as well as its nodal structure, raise a number of accountability issues which inhibit the proper legal protection of human rights even when responsibility can be clearly demarcated. 224 Hathaway, supra n 6 at 2023; Klein, supra n 24 at 441; Posner, supra n 7. the barbeque' by politicians. 225 The Australian Human Rights Commission ('AHRC') likewise monitors Australia's human rights obligations but has no enforcement power and cannot make binding recommendations. 226 The Australian Government has moreover blocked the AHRC's request to visit the Nauru RPC for investigative purposes as its jurisdiction does not extend beyond Australia's sovereign borders. 227 Consequently, monitoring how Australia and Nauru deal with their international legal human rights obligations in practice is limited and does not produce binding results: de jure rights therefore hardly materialize as de facto safeguards and are consequently compromised. 228 Conversely, Australian national courts which do deliver binding judgments often cannot and/or do not take (international) human rights obligations into account. This is aptly illustrated by a recent High Court case, in which a challenge to the legality of the Australian-Nauruan offshore processing arrangements brought by lawyers on behalf of a Bangladeshi woman was rejected on the basis of the Australian Constitution (which does not contain a bill of rights) and national law. 229 Human rights obligations were not mentioned in the judgment and thus largely remain international figments in a nationally-oriented juridical system. This distinguishes the Australian-Pacific region from other parts of the world where human rights law, be it to varying extents, finds application through national bills of rights and regional supervisory courts.
Second, as has also been mentioned above, the Nauru RPC is characterized by limited transparency and openness. This is on the one hand due to the walls of governance that are erected: many of the bilateral and contractual arrangements between the various public and private actors involved remain secret and the corporate actors involved act without much public scrutiny. 230 On the other hand, the lack of transparency and openness is enhanced by the physical and procedural remoteness of the centre. 231 A variety of observers are indeed unable to visit the RPC, either because they are denied permission to enter the RPC or because they are denied a visa to Nauru. 233 human rights advocates, 234 and researchers. 235 Nauru has furthermore raised the nonrefundable visa application fees for journalists in January 2014 with 4000%, from AUD$200 to AUD$8000. 236 In addition, Nauru has a limited media scene and freedom of press. 237 It is thus simultaneously 'difficult to look into and to look out of' the RPC. 238 Information only comes out incidentally through whistle-blowers and leaked reports that were never meant for publication. 239 It is therefore difficult to see whether human rights abuses occur and which actors contribute to potential abuses -a problem which has been labelled as one of 'many hands'. 240 This lack of transparency and comprehensibility of the nodal governance system makes it difficult not only to assert legal responsibility (as it inhibits an assessment of the factual power arrangements and allows the various involved actors to refer to one another as the relevant responsible actor, as outlined above), but also to hold States accountable in practice (as abuses remain covert and do not surface). 241 It is as such difficult for the inside world to speak out and for the outside world to either witness or hear about concrete human rights abuses and to subsequently step in to hold actors accountable, no matter how clear that actor's responsibility is on the legal plane.
Remarkably, after its contract at the RPC ended, Save the Children Australia explicitly called upon the Australian Government to increase transparency at the RPC and to introduce mandatory reporting by all of the service providers on human rights. 242 The problematic lack of transparency and openness is thus not only ascertained by external commentators, but also explicitly acknowledged by a former actor in the field.
CONCLUSION: HUMAN RIGHTS AS LOST CAUSE?
Whereas some consider the concept of human rights as a conundrum with internationalist allure, others consider it to be a panacea for governance accountability. When international human rights law gained momentum, the focus was very much on the latter: curtailing the public powers of sovereign States as the prime (and arguably sole) duty bearers. 243 In contemporary reality, however, sovereign territorial States have long ceased to be -or, on a different reading, never in fact were -the primary actors with a significant impact on human rights entitlements. Processes of privatisation and extra-territorialisation nowadays cross and bridge the borders between sovereign territories and between the public and private spheres, thereby diffusing the State's role as main governance actor. The Nauru RPC provides an accurate example of both developments, combining the extraterritorialisation and privatisation of immigration control in the Australian-Pacific realm.
This article has questioned whether international human rights law continues to constitute a proper framework of legal responsibility and accountability in such cases -especially as it is often relied upon in pressuring Australia, 244 Nauru 245 and the involved private contractors. 246 On the level of responsibility, both jurisdiction and attribution constitute significant obstacles. Private contractors do not carry human rights duties as of yet and can thus not be held responsible under international human rights law. The jurisdiction of Nauru is presumed on the basis of territoriality, whilst establishing Australia's jurisdiction requires the effective control over territory and/or persons -which, in turn, depends on a difficult-to-perform assessment of the constantly changing factual arrangements and power structures. In relation to attribution, the conduct of de jure or de facto state actors can be attributed to the respective State, but in this case, most human rights-sensible conduct is exercised by private contractors. 247 For both the attribution of their conduct to either Australia or Nauru and the determination of derived responsibility, one of the various attribution tests needs to be fulfilled, which is however likewise 242 Save the Children, 'In Its Last Act on Nauru, Save the Children Calls for Independent Oversight across All problematic because of the constantly changing factual governance arrangements. This is not different in relation to positive obligations: to establish responsibility on this basis, the factual arrangements and systems in place are decisive yet significantly opaque.
For establishing international human rights responsibility, the biggest problem is therefore not the mere reality that additional States and private actors are involved. Rather, it is the fact that in such cases, the avenues to address responsibility under international human rights law require a factual assessment of effective control (and thus of the way in which the RPC is governed). Nodal governance theory shows, however, that power and control are everywhere, not with a particular actor -at least not at all times. This inhibits distilling effective control on behalf of a specific actor.
Transfield/Broadspectrum has for example taken over the responsibilities of other private contractors in providing a number of services and is consequently potentially exercising a more dominant power and a larger extent of control than before. Likewise, Nauru has increasingly taken over responsibilities from the Australian government over the past years, including in relation to managing the centres at an operational level 248 and in relation to the processing of asylum claims. 249 Also, Nauru increasingly acknowledges its own active and leading role in requesting Australia to provide services and support.
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The Nauruan Government even issued a media release in relation to its asylum processing with the title 'Nauru is not Australia', in which it emphasised its position in the RPC arrangements through 'a simple message -remember that Nauru is not a state of Australia!' 251 As such, Nauru's role in governing the RPC has arguably become more prominent and leading -although the question remains whether these transfers of responsibilities are genuine or amount to mere window-dressing. The Australian High Court has recently answered this question in the negative: transferred asylum seekers should, in the Court's opinion, be regarded as 'detained in custody under the laws of Nauru' 252 and subjected to 'the independent exercise of sovereign legislative and executive power by Nauru'. 253 It also found that there was no joint governmental authority being exercised: only the Nauruan government exercises authority at the RPC.
254
In the end, it remains unclear how exactly the mix of various mentalities, technologies, resources, institutional structures and goals of the plethora of actors plays out in practice and who, thus, potentially controls whom or what at which stage. This article has hence explicitly not argued that it is impossible to 248 DIBP, supra n 55 at 11; Nauru Government Information Office, supra n 56. determine human rights responsibility, but rather that it can continuously change and is difficult to establish given the fluctuating and hybrid arrangements and power structures. As a result, the rules of international human rights law allow a certain leeway to States to dispute and ignore responsibility both in general and in concrete cases. As Gammeltoft-Hansen points out, 'assessing what may reasonably be expected from a state is open to contestation and States have been keen to argue that they were either unknowing or incapable of taking action to prevent human rights abuses'. 255 This leads to the danger that Both Australia and Nauru have in fact denied responsibility. 257 That is the reality, and arguably the weakness, of international human rights law in a nodal setting. As Kennedy puts it in the context of privatisation, if we do not come to terms with this reality, 'we will find ourselves dealing with
Nineteenth century animals in a twenty-first century legal zoo'.
258
Yet even if these problems can be overcome, human rights monitoring in the Australian-Pacific context remains weak and does not produce binding judgments or penalties. In addition, many human rights abuses remain hidden because of the nodal field's limited transparency and openness, which beats even the most absolute norm and the clearest legal responsibility. Establishing de jure responsibility is thus extremely difficult, but even if one succeeds, accountability is not effectuated with sufficient force de facto because many abuses remain undetected whilst those detected generally are not enforced through binding sanctions. This is detrimental to the legal protection of human rights, as treaty provisions remain paper tigers without proper enforcement of sanctions in cases of non-compliance. 259 No matter the noble promises of internationally codified human rights -in the end of the day, you cannot eat them 260 nor use them as physical shields against abuse or maltreatment. Human rights violations accordingly 'all too often seem to make a mockery of the proliferation of procedures, committees and commissions on human rights'.
261
The conclusion is hence a rather pessimistic one: international human rights law's value as legal protection mechanism in the context of the Nauru RPC is limited at best, seriously flawed at worst. The be held accountable for them under international law but because the language of human rights carries significant symbolic power and rights-respecting behaviour may be considered a condition or advantage when awarding a (sub)contract to a private actor. 269 The contrary can also be imagined: rights can be used as argument or frame of reference to explain away injustices and moral wrongs: the minimum standards of human rights can, as such, discursively be reframed as the maximum standard of protection owed. 270 Whilst beyond the scope of the present article, these potential extra-legal functions need to be empirically examined to further assess the actual value and impact of the human rights concept in a concrete context. In particular in nodal settings, such additional roles may constitute a cause for more overall optimism or further pessimism about the actual merit of human rights. 271 With nodal detention increasingly being utilized, the time has indeed come to combine the legal with the empirical plane in order to draw conclusions on whether human rights constitute a durable normative, conceptual and practical framework to provide detained individuals with adequate protection in the long run. the precise formulations and in spite of practices that violate the set norms, results in the gradual creation of a language that every party to the negotiations will have to use' (translated from the original Dutch text): Witteveen, supra n 268 at 153. 270 Posner, supra n 7. 271 In her work, Dembour outlined four 'schools of thought' on human rights that could be indicative for the various roles and functions that the human rights notion can fulfil beyond the legal realm: see Dembour (2006; 2010) , supra n 9. Understanding human rights respectively as natural entitlements, deliberative principles, protest claims and discursive expressions, these schools could function as a basis for further analysis of the actual value and merit of human rights as a multi-faceted, multi-interpretable and cross-disciplinary concept.
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